Empirical evidence shows that an increase in trade liberalisation causes an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we propose an explanation to this apparent puzzle by exploiting the intensity of competition in a Bertrand duopoly with convex costs where the two …rms enter in a new market. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, delivering a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing, to show that softening competition may indeed more than o¤set the standard e¤ect generated by trade costs, thereby leading to a positive relationship between trade liberalisation and FDIs.
Introduction
The standard theory of multinational corporations suggests that a decrease in trade tari¤s would reduce the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI). 1 Indeed, the adoption of FDIs has the aim to avoid tari¤s by installing productive capacity in the country of the market where the …rm operates (the so-called tari¤-jumping argument). Nonetheless, stylised facts on FDIs show that the increase in trade liberalisation has led in fact to an increase in the volume of FDIs. 2 In a recent contribution, Collie (2011) explains this paradox in a setting with two regions and two countries in each of them, Cournot competition and linear costs. He shows that multilateral trade liberalisation may induce …rms to shift from exporting to FDIs if the inter-regional transport cost is su¢ ciently high. 3 We propose an alternative explanation in a setting where two Bertrand …rms, supplying a homogeneous good with a convex cost function, enter the market of a foreign country. They choose between exporting, which involves a linear cost associated with either shipping or tari¤s, or undertaking FDIs, involving a sunk cost. We model Bertrand competition as in Dastidar (1995) , yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, ranging also above marginal cost pricing. Our results show that the paradox of an increase in FDI as trade liberalisation increases can be explained on the basis of the intensity of price competition in the host market, provided the FDI sunk costs are su¢ ciently low for the FDI strategy to be viable.
The model
We consider a world with two countries, labelled 1 and 2. In country 1 there are two …rms, labelled A and B. They produce the same homogeneous good, and have symmetric and convex production costs:
where q is the quantity produced by each …rm and c > 0: Consider a scenario in which both …rms can supply the market of country 2, hosting no home …rms at all. Let the inverse demand expressed by consumers of country 2 be linear:
Firms A and B can enter country 2 in two alternative ways, namely, by (i) exporting from country 1 or (ii) undertaking FDIs. In the …rst case, they bear a cost t 2 (0; 1) for each unit exported, which can be interpreted either as a transportation cost or a tari¤, and thus obtaining pro…ts:
while in the alternative case they incur the sunk costs k > 0, with pro…ts:
Results
According to Dastidar (1995) , if …rms have symmetric convex costs and compete à la Bertrand, the Nash equilibrium is necessarily non-unique. In particular, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is characterised by both …rms setting the same price p , which is bounded by two thresholds p avc p p u : The lower bound p avc (the superscript avc stands for average variable cost) equals average variable costs, letting …rms be indi¤erent between either producing at p or producing nothing at all. The upper bound p u (with superscript u standing for undercutting) is the price at which …rms are indi¤erent between choosing price p u , and marginally undercutting it in order to capture the entire demand at p u .
If both …rms export their respective home plants, the level of p avc is given by equating the inverse demand function to the average variable cost (which includes the trading cost):
then solving for q and substituting in the demand function we obtain:
The upper bound of the equilibrium price obtains by imposing indi¤erence between duopoly pro…ts (3) and the monopoly pro…ts generated by undercutting:
Solving for p; we obtain
Finally, by equating the inverse demand function to the marginal cost, solving for q and substituting into p; we obtain the price equal to marginal cost:
where the superscript mc stands for marginal cost pricing. The continuum of Nash equilibria can be represented by the following expression:
Parameter represents the relative intensity of price competition between …rms. Note that, when = 0; in equilibrium price equals average variable cost; = 1 corresponds to the Bertrand reference case in which price is equal to marginal cost, while at = 4=3 the price attains the highest level above which undercutting takes place. As a consequence, 2 [0; 4=3] : Using (10), the individual pro…t function (3) writes:
The per-…rm equilibrium pro…ts obtained by undertaking FDI can be easily found by setting t = 0 in equation (11) and subtracting the FDI sunk cost k:
Of course, in order for F DI to be positive, the following condition must hold:
the straightforward implication of (13) is that exporting is the only viable strategy for all k > b k: By comparing ex with F DI , it emerges that F DI
Finally, note that:
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For all k 2 h 0; e k i , both …rms undertake FDIs to install capacity in the host country. For all k > e k, both …rms choose to export from their home sites.
We are now in a position to exploit this result in order to explain the puzzle for which trade liberalisation leads to an increase in the volume of FDIs. This can be ascertained by evaluating the relationship between e k, whose increase leads to an increase in FDI, and t; whose decrease leads to an increase in trade liberalisation.
Totally di¤erentiating e k yields:
Examining (16), one observes that the coe¢ cient of dt is unambiguously positive for all admissible values of parameters. This feature is fully in line with the established theoretical wisdom dating back to Horstmann and Markusen (1992) , Motta (1992) and Rowthorn (1992) . Conversely, the coe¢ cient of d is negative for all
Note that
so that for c < 2, the sign of the coe¢ cient of d in (16) may change depending on the level of . The ongoing discussion can be summarised in That is, the standard e¤ect associated with trade liberalisation (i.e., a positive relationship between trade costs and FDIs) can indeed be reversed if (i) marginal cost is su¢ ciently low and (ii) the intensity of price competition is also su¢ ciently low. The intuitive reason is that increasing in combination with a low marginal cost expands the mark up and therefore makes it easier for …rms to bear the sunk cost of a new plant abroad.
Finally, we brie ‡y discuss the di¤erent implications on the social welfare of the host country in the two alternative situations. In the case of export, we will consider, alternatively, t as (i) a transportation cost or (ii) a tari¤. If t is meant to be a transportation cost, the host country's social welfare trivially coincides with its own consumer surplus, i.e.:
where superscript tc stands for transportation cost. Obviously, any increase in transportation costs hinders consumer surplus. Instead, if t is a tari¤, then the tari¤ revenue contributes to the host country's social welfare, together with consumer surplus:
where the superscript ta stands for tari¤. Clearly, W ta ex > W tc ex : Moreover, as t here becomes a policy instrument in the hands of the host country's government, is can be easily established that Finally, in the case of FDI, again the host country's social welfare is given by its consumer surplus (the same as (19), with t = 0):
We now compare the three alternatives. This amounts to saying that imports are preferred to FDIs if and only if t can be controlled by the host country to generate revenues more than o¤setting the negative e¤ect on consumer surplus.
